Arbitration -- The Arbitrator\u27s Duty to Disclose Past Business Relationships With a Party by Murchison, John M., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 47 | Number 4 Article 10
6-1-1969
Arbitration -- The Arbitrator's Duty to Disclose Past
Business Relationships With a Party
John M. Murchison Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John M. Murchison Jr., Arbitration -- The Arbitrator's Duty to Disclose Past Business Relationships With a Party, 47 N.C. L. Rev. 888
(1969).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol47/iss4/10
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Container Corporation indicates that the Supreme Court is acutely
aware of the economic setting in which the cooperative activities of busi-
nessmen take place. The Court is particularly insistent that oligopolists,
because of the tremendous control they already have over the market,
the natural tendency to price uniformity in oligopolistic industries, and
the advantageous position they are in to defeat the competitive processes,
not be allowed to remove any of the uncertainties that prevent them from
obtaining even firmer control of the market. The corrugated container
industry was ideally conducive to oligopolistic manipulation, except for
the uncertainty created by the individualized nature of the product. The
exchanges of price information eliminated that uncertainty. The Supreme
Court was unwilling to allow the defendants, already rich in power, that
additional luxury.
BEN F. TENNILLE
Arbitration-The Arbitrator's Duty to Disclose Past Business
Relationships With a Party
"[W] here your treasure is, there will your heart be also."' This gen-
erally recognized element of human nature-that a man will be partial to-
ward his own self-interest-is the reason for the rule that "no man shall
be a judge in his own cause." 2 Acceptance of society's insistence that
disputes among its members be resolved through the use of a judicial
process, rather than through the use of violence or other forms of "self-
help," depends to a great extent on the evident fairness and impartiality
of the judicial system.3 In the leading case of Tuiney v. Ohio,4 the
Supreme Court held that it was a violation of due process to subject a
defendant's liberty or property "to the judgment of a court the judge of
which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a
conclusion against him in his case." 5 In Tumey, the defendant was tried
and convicted by the village mayor, who received additional compensation
from all those tried by him only if they were found guilty. The Supreme
'Matthew 6:21.'Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610).
'See Hart & McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, in THE HAYDEN
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENTIFIC CONCEPT AND METHOD 51-56 (1958).
'273 U.S. 510 (1927).
rId. at 523.
[Vol. 47
ARBITRATOR'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE
Court reversed the defendant's conviction; it did not matter that there
was no evidence of actual bias against the defendant:
[T]he requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not
satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest
self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice. Every pro-
cedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a
judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between
the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.
0
The extent of the judge's self-interest needed to constitute a denial
of due process cannot be defined with precision. 7 "Circumstances and rela-
tionships must be considered."" But "the administration of justice should
reasonably appear to be disinterested as well as be so in fact."9
The law regarding disqualification of judges because of self-interest
applies equally to administrative adjudicators.' In both the administrative
and judicial setting, the law forces the parties to accept the findings and
judgment of the adjudicator; their right to a fair and impartial hearing
is guaranteed by the due process clause of the Constitution. 1' A related,
but different, problem regarding impartiality is presented when parties by
agreement go outside the judicial system for settlement of their disputes,
as in arbitration, where the constitutional right of a fair trial would not be
applicable.'
2
"Arbitration ... is a process by which parties voluntarily refer their
disputes to an impartial third person, an arbitrator, selected by them for
a decision based on the evidence and arguments to be presented before
the arbitration tribunal."' 3 Protection against a partial arbitrator must




"See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1954).8 Id. at 136.
'Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466 (1952) (statement of reasons
for self-disqualification by Mr. Justice Frankfurter).
" See generally, K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.03 (1958) ; see
also Note, Administrative Law--Bias: "No Man Shall Judge His Own Cause," 47
N.C.L. REv. 677 (1969).
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
"See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1955).
" M. DOMxE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01, at
1 (1968). See W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS (1930).
' See discussion and cases cited in M. DOMKE, supra note 13, § 33.02.
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In Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 5 a
subcontractor had sued the sureties on the bond of the prime contractor
for money allegedly due for a painting job. The painting contract included
an agreement to arbitrate such controversies."6 Each party named one
arbitrator, and these two selected the third. The third arbitrator, owner
of an engineering firm that provided services to construction companies,
had in the past done. business with the prime contractor involved in the
dispute. The panel voted unanimously in favor of the prime contractor.
The subcontractor challenged the award in the district court on
grounds, inter alia, that it did not know and had not been informed by
either the "neutral" arbitrator or the prime contractor of these previous
dealings between them. There was no contention that the arbitrator was
not entirely fair and unbiased. The district court refused to set aside
the award 7 and the court of appeals affirmed.18 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari"9 and a divided Court reversed the lower courts and
vacated the arbitration award.20
The United States Arbitration Act2' governed the controversy in this
1 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
1 The arbitration agreement in the contract read as follows:
If any question of fact shall arise under this contract, either party hereto may
demand an arbitration by reference to a Board of Arbitration, to consist of
one person selected by Contractor, and one person selected by Sub-contractor,
these two to select a third, and in case these two fail to select a third within
three days, he shall be named by the Architect or his authorized representative.
In case either Contractor or Sub-contractor fails to name an arbitrator within
three days after requested to do so, the Architect, or his authorized repre-
sentatives, shall name an arbitrator to represent the party so failing to name
one. The written decision of any two of this Board shall be final and binding
on both parties hereto. Each party shall pay one-half of the expenses of such
reference. Arbitration of a demand or decisions by the Architect or Owner
shall be made within 5 days following notification to Sub-contractor of such
demand or decision, otherwise Sub-contractor shall be bound thereby, unless
the Owner shall agree to arbitration after that period. Provided, nothing
contained herein shall excuse Sub-contractor from completion of the work in
the manner provided in this contract nor-shall the pendency of any dispute
or arbitration proceeding excuse any delay, deficiency, default, or noncompli-
ance therewith.
Quoted in Brief for Petitioner at 4,5 and Brief for Respondent at 7-8 n.5, Common-
wealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
17 The decision by the United States District Court for Puerto Rico is not re-
ported.
"8 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 382 F.2d 1010 (Ist
Cir. 1967)." Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 390 U.S. 979 (1968).
"0393 U.S. 145 (1968).
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1964).
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case.2 2 Section 10 of this act denotes the reasons for which an award may
be vacated.2 The Court felt that the provisions allowing vacation of the
award where it was "procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means" or
"where there was evident partiality . . . in the arbitrators" showed an
intent on the part of Congress that arbitration be impartial. 24 While there
was no charge that the third arbitrator was guilty of fraud or bias or
that he had any improper motives, the failure to disclose the past business
relationship with one party violated "the strict morality and fairness
Congress would have expected on the part of the arbitrator and the other
party in this case."23
The Court reasoned that the constitutional basis of the rule in Tumey
26
should not prevent its application to non-judicial adjudication that is
governed by statutory language embodying the same concept of im-
partiality.2 7 A rule of the American Arbitration Association 2 1 providing
for disclosure by arbitrators of past relationships with parties, as well as
22 393 U.S. at 146-47.
2' In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award
upon the application of any party to the arbitration-
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter sub-
mitted was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement
required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its dis-
cretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1964).2'393 U.S. at 147.
25 Id. at 148.
"273 U.S. 510 (1927).
393 U.S. at 148.
" Section 18. Disclosure by Arbitrator of Disqualification-At the time of
receiving his notice of appointment, the prospective Arbitrator is requested
to disclose any circumstances likely to create a presumption of bias or which
he believes might disqualify him as an impartial Arbitrator. Upon receipt of
such information, the Tribunal Clerk shall immediately disclose it to the
parties, who if willing to proceed under the circumstances disclosed, shall,
in writing, so advise the Tribunal Clerk. If either party declines to waive the
presumptive disqualification, the vacancy thus created shall be filled in
accordance with the applicable provisions of this Rule.
Id. at 149, quoting AMERICAN ARBITRATio AssocIATIoN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION RULES § 18.
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a canon of judicial ethics 29 providing for the avoidance of actions that
might raise suspicions, neither of which were directly applicable to this
controversy, were noted to show that these concepts of disclosure and of
avoidance of suspicions were accepted elements of what is to be considered
fair conduct on the part of those who perform adjudicatory functions.3 0
The concurring. opinion by Mr. Justice White3' declared that the
Court's ruling did not hold arbitrators to the standards of judicial decorum
required of judges, but only that disclosure was required "where the
arbitrator has a substantial interest in a firm which has done more than
trivial business with a party ... ."2 Mr. Justice Fortas' dissent33 denied
that the failure to volunteer information constituted "evident partiality"
under the Arbitration Act where there was no claim of any actual par-
tiality, or bias, or improper motive.34
In its successful efforts in the lower courts, 35 the respondent prime
contractor relied on the case of Ilios Shipping & Trading Corp. v.
AmericanL Anthracite & Bituminous Coal Corp.30 for the proposition
that "the mere fact that there is some business relationship between
the arbitrator and one of the parties to the arbitration is not in and
of itself sufficient to disqualify the arbitrator."3' The court in Ilios rea-
soned that since the objecting party knew the arbitrator was employed
in the insurance business, he should have inquired as to any relation-
ship between the arbitrator and the other party.38 Failing to do this,
knowledge of the relationship will be imputed to the objecting party
and he will be deemed to have waived his objection for failure to assert
it earlier."9 Thus, one basis of the holding in Ilios is the imputed knowl-
edge the objecting party had of the relationship between the arbitrator
2933 Social Relations.
... [A judge] should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before
him be particularly careful to avoid such actions as may reasonably tend
to awaken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships
constitute an element in influencing his judicial conduct.
Id. at 149-50, quoting ABA CANoNs OF JUDICIAL ETHIcs No. 33.
'o Id. at 149-50.
I11d. at 150 (Mr. Justice Marshall joining).
'2 Id. at 151-52.
33Id. at 152 (justices Harlan and Stewart joined in the dissent).
0 Id. at 154.
' 382 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1967).
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and the other party. In Commonwealth, on the other hand, the Supreme
Court emphasized that
the facts concerning the close business connections between the third
arbitrator and the prime contractor were unknown to petitioner and were
never revealed to it by this arbitrator, by the prime contractor, or by
anyone else until after an award had been made.40
While this may be one manner of distinguishing the Ilios case, there
is considerable authority supporting the view that an arbitrator's failfire
to disclose past business relations with a party does not constitute "evi-
dent partiality" under the Arbitration Act.4 At the same time, there
are instances where the opposite view has prevailed-where the failure
to disclose the relationship resulted in vacating the contested award.42
The differences in result would seem to hinge on fine distinctions
in the fact situations. Should the possibility of the relationship have been
apparent to the objecting party?13 Was the relationship vague and
remote,44 or was it close enough to cause concern as to the arbitrator's
impartiality ?4' Although finding in favor of respondent in Commonwealth,
the court of appeals noted the closeness of the distinctions involved:
In our opinion there is a difficult line between what should, in good
faith, be volunteered, and what may be left for inquiry. We may agree
with appellant that where there is a disturbingly close relationship the
very failure to make disclosure could be evidence of partiality, and we
think it would have been far better if there had been disclosure here.
However, we cannot say that the relationship was sufficiently close to
establish 'evident partiality' within the statute as a matter of law.46
Undoubtedly, the trend of the courts has been to set strict limits on
judicial interference with arbitration awards.47 Frequent court inter-
40 393 U.S. at 146. In a Petition for Rehearing filed January 16, 1969, the re-
spondent contends "[tjhere is not a scintilla of evidence to support" the Court's con-
clusion that "the facts concerning the close business connections between the third
arbitrator and the prime contractor were unknown to petitioner .... ." Respondent's
Petition for Rehearing at 1.
"' See, e.g., Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Barnard, 177 F. Supp. 123
(E.D. Ky. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 285 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1960).
" See, e.g., Rogers v. Schering Corp., 165 F. Supp. 295 (D.N.J. 1958), aft'd,
271 F.2d 266 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 991 (1959).
" See Ilios Shipping & Trading Corp. v. American Anthracite & Bituminous
Coal Corp., 148 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 245 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1957).
"' See Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Barnard, 177 F. Supp. 123 (E.D.
Ky. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 285 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1960).
See American Guar. Co. v. Caldwell, 72 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1934).
"382 F.2d at 1011-12.
"See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flo6f& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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ference might frustrate "the basic purpose of arbitration, which is to
dispose of disputes quickly and avoid the expense and delay of extended
court proceedings. 48 Although the action of the Court in Commonwealth
in vacating the arbitration award and imposing a rule requiring disclosure
on the arbitrator might at first glance appear to run counter to this ideal,
a closer analysis indicates that the contrary is more likely. Certainly it
was the aim of the Court, in formulating its rule requiring disclosure, to
minimize the judicial role in arbitration. The rule formulated by the
Court-that an arbitrator has a duty to disclose to the parties any deal-
ings that might create an impression of possible bias-should strengthen
the arbitration process and minimize judicial interference in at least two
ways. First, requiring disclosure should give the parties additional faith
in the fairness of the proceedings. Mr. Dooley advised: "Trust every-
body-but cut the cards.""0 A duty of disclosure is an additional "cut
of the cards" that should tend to lessen suspicions of a losing party that
he was treated unfairly. With this additional confidence in the settlement
process, the loser is less likely to take his complaint to the courts. Second,
the rule requiring disclosure will provide an easily recognizable standard
of conduct for the arbitrator. A hazy standard regarding impartiality
might lead the losing party to attempt to obtain a favorable court interpre-
tation. Judicial re-view of an arbitration award would appear to be sought
less often where the demarcation between acceptable and unacceptable
conduct is clear. Thus, the decision in Commonwealth should serve to
strengthen the participants' confidence in arbitration, and should decrease
further the possibility of unnecessary judicial interference in the arbitra-
tion process.
JoHN M. MURCHISON, JR.
Civil Procedure-Attachment of Liability Insurance Policies
The plaintiff, a New York resident, is injured in an automobile acci-
dent in another state. The wrongdoer, who is not subject to personal
jurisdiction in New York, is insured under a liability policy issued in the
state of his residence by an insurance company that does business in New
See generally, Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Altitude, 45 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 519 (1960) ; Comment, Commercial Arbitration: Expanding the Judicial
Role, 52 MixN. L. REv. 1218 (1968).
"' Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc.. 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d
Cir. 1967).
" F. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S PIn.oso.:[v (1900).
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